The geography of the British-Irish question is commonly expressed in terms of North-South and east-west relations following the 1998 Belfast Agreement. Nationalists prioritise North-South relations and unionists east-west ones.
But we need to unravel and then reweave these terms for a better understanding of the relations they describe.
The Irish-British question differs from the British-Irish one, just as their South-North and west-east counterparts do. Their perspectives vary because of differing geographies, histories, cultures and scales. Nationalism and unionism do not have the same meanings in Ireland, Northern Ireland, Scotland, England and Wales. That helps explain the many confusions and ambiguities of politics across these islands.
Most of the shared commonalities arise from the greater demographic and imperial power employed by England over centuries, as it conquered and colonised first this archipelago and then many other lands in North America, India, Asia and Africa. Its subsequent battles to maintain a strategic autonomy from – yet hegemonic involvement with – Europe determined the wider settings in which British-Irish and Irish-British relations were historically laid down.
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These settings are now unravelling so fast it is hard to keep up with the pace of geopolitical and geoeconomic change. Britain is having to choose between the transatlantic and European relationships forged first by empire and then in retreat from it by Donald Trump’s revisionism – even though it is locked into a triangular relationship with each since the second World War. A similar set of choices on a smaller and more dependent scale faces Ireland between the United States and the European Union. That helps explain why so many efforts are being made to rethink and reset relations across these islands. Disturbingly, they are happening mostly alongside the Belfast Agreement institutions rather than through them. The Shared Island initiative revived by Micheál Martin complements the North-South bodies, while Dublin’s ambitious reset with London involving annual summits and a substantive four-item agenda bypasses the established but little used east-west ones.
Presented as a consensual space by State and political elites, it is also contested. The Shared Island perspective is counterpoised to the united Ireland ones supported by Sinn Féin and Leo Varadkar. Closer Dublin-London links with the Labour government have potential benefits for Northern Ireland unionists; but they remain politically marginalised by their recent deep links with British Conservatives and Brexit supporters.
Running through these debates is a continuing battle between those who say reconciliation should precede constitutional change and those who say preparing for a united Ireland allows a reconciled Ireland and a new Irish-British relationship to be negotiated into place.
Understanding how such Irish and British constitutional futures play out and intertwine has been the focus of a research project I have been working on in UCD for the last five years. It has concluded with a conference and book launch that offer fresh approaches to existing and prospective relations among these islands. That is reflected in the book’s title, Political Change across Britain and Ireland, emphasising the transversal links and mutual influences between their respective polities. The analysis includes changes in the UK as a whole, its devolved territories and jurisdictions, those in the Republic of Ireland and in England, still overwhelmingly the largest territory of them all but the least democratically represented. The book’s subtitle – Identities, Institutions and Futures – explains its approach to these questions. They are linked but distinct concerns, subject to all the changes we are living through and drawing them together.
Looking ahead, it is clear that Irish and British political and constitutional futures are codependent and entangled. The UK’s own political union is put under strain by its failure to resolve the contradictions between the continuing but unreconstructed London power centre and the devolution of power to peripheral territories in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Intergovernmental relations between them are poorly organised, undemocratic and made far more complex by Brexit.
Scottish and Welsh dissatisfaction with this structure is seen in sustained support for nationalist parties supporting independence. Labour’s efforts to head that off with UK-wide delivery of reform and improved material wellbeing are stymied by poor growth, deep regional and social inequalities and hyper-orthodox economic management. Profound Brexit and transatlantic uncertainties add to this mix, which fuels Reform UK’s right-wing populist appeal.
Nationalists, unionists and those agnostic about such labels in Ireland all need to keep an informed eye on these UK developments in their debates on Irish futures. That is prudent – like fire insurance. It is the smarter pathway for smaller beasts living alongside such an indifferent, confused elephant.
