Redesigning the core executive of a government will always be controversial among democratic politicians and it is internationally rare to invite unelected samples of the public to consider complex constitutional engineering of this most important institution.
But the Republic of Ireland has been a democratic leader in public participation in citizens' assemblies tasked to consider constitutional amendments.
And there have been similar scholarly, rather than government-backed, experiments with smaller-scale deliberative forums in the North.
In 2024 the Analysing and Researching Ireland North and South (Arins) team organised two deliberative forums – managed discussions among groups – in Athlone and Belfast to see how samples of the public would respond to possible models of government formation, also known as executive formation, in a united Ireland once they had a chance to learn about them and discuss them in detail.
The forums complemented the Arins/Irish Times surveys, which we used to identify the views of the public, North and South, on how best to govern a united Ireland in the event that Irish unification was supported in referendums.
We presented participants at the deliberative forums with five possible models, which they then considered in round-table discussions and in question-and-answer sessions.
We made clear that we were discussing the central government of a parliamentary system, one which would exist whether a united Ireland becomes a centralised unitary state or a unitary state with a devolved executive and assembly in the North.
We described the core features of each model as follows:
The existing Irish model
In this model, executive formation would proceed in the same way as it does at present in the Republic of Ireland. Any party winning an absolute majority in Dáil Éireann would form the government and nominate the prime minister/taoiseach, who in turn would nominate 15 cabinet ministers.
But if no single party on the island had a majority of seats after an election, then any combination of parties that could command a majority could form the government. No special provisions would exist under unification for Northern parties from a British or unionist tradition. They would be treated just like any other party: they could become part of a coalition government, but no rules would require that they must be part of the Government.
The Northern Irish model
A strikingly different way to organise the executive in a united Ireland would be to adopt an approach that resembles that used in Belfast since the Belfast Agreement, Northern Ireland’s 1998 peace agreement.
The all-island government would be formed as a powersharing arrangement, with two joint prime ministers: one from the largest party that chose to join the “British” bloc in the all-island parliament and one from the largest party that chose to join the “Irish” bloc.
Either the British or the Irish bloc could veto the formation of the government and after a government was formed either of the two prime ministers might choose to resign, causing the collapse of the government and a fresh general election.
The prime minister from the British bloc would be able to veto proposed legislation which they claim harms a fundamental interest or right of the people who identify as British or unionist on the island. The government could, however, override this veto if the Supreme Court found the claim invalid. (This rule would tweak the present arrangements in the North).
The government would include all political parties with significant support which wished to participate: all political parties passing a minimum threshold of 7 per cent of the seats would have the right to be part of the governing coalition.
We then presented three hybrid or compromise models modifying existing arrangements in the Republic and the North to see if any of these would be judged better for a united Ireland.
The inclusive coalition model
Under this model governments would be formed through “inclusive coalitions”. In one way, this approach would resemble what now happens in Northern Ireland. Parties that pass a minimum threshold of seats would have the automatic right to be part of the coalition government. They would get cabinet ministries in proportion to their size in seats won in parliament. Under unification this process would make it likely that the largest unionist party would have one or two cabinet seats.
However, unlike the present Northern system, there would be just one prime minister – the leader of the largest party in the all-island parliament – and British unionists would have no veto over legislation or government formation (or maintenance).
The quota model
In another possible model, which would have stronger safeguards for unionists, any government formed under unification would reserve two cabinet ministries for British-unionist politicians elected in one of the northern six counties; these ministers would have the right to veto legislation deemed to undermine the interests of those who identify as British, again subject to Supreme Court review.
The territorial model
A last approach to organising government formation under unification would prioritise the meaningful representation of the present “North”, proportionally based on comparative population size, to minimise any risk that a united Ireland would be dominated by the current South in a united Ireland. On today’s figures, this would mean that at least four out of the 15 cabinet ministers must be elected from one or other of the six northern counties.
