At first glance, the IRFU's statement on foot of the review by management consultants Genesis into Ireland's World Cup sheds little or no light on the reasons for that abject campaign. But the union's omissions, both from the statement and from their presentation to the committee, are more revealing.
That the union's four-man World Cup review/steering committee included two of the men involved in granting Eddie O'Sullivan a four-year extended contract prior to the World Cup, Noel Murphy and Philip Browne, had long fuelled fears it would be largely a cosmetic exercise, all the more so as it was delayed until so close to the Six Nations. Throw in the confidentiality agreement between the IRFU and IRUPA, the players' body, and the presentation by Brian Porteous of Genesis, even to the committee, only being made orally with the help of some slides, added to that suspicion.
At the outset, Porteous made it clear that attributing fault was not part of his brief. Many positives emerged from the review.
Fitness levels were first-class, a point reaffirmed by Browne on radio yesterday. The same was true of the physiotherapy, the medical back-up (Ireland enjoyed a remarkably low injury profile), video analysis and financial support.
The negatives were manifold, such as the match unreadiness of the team and the key players; a lack of confidence in the execution in the game plan; leadership responses to events as they unfolded - ie, the consequences of pool rivals Argentina beating France in the World Cup opener and Ireland's initially sluggish performances against Namibia and Georgia. Indeed, the only response was to carry on picking the same team and coaching the same way, only harder.
This is supported by the review's conclusion that Ireland were obliged to have a first-XV strategy (though that is a moot point). Indeed, the reportedly excellent fitness levels hardly tally with the later revelation by Porteous that there were differences of opinion among those interviewed with regard to fitness, along with issues of tiredness and reports of weight loss, and a question over the balance between work and relaxation, and training facilities in Ireland.
These have been questioned or outlined in these pages before, all of which supports the theory that the players were overtrained and the players' submissions highlighted this.
The leadership of the management and coaching team was also raised, and a selection policy that so blatantly concentrated on the first-choice team (more so than any of the 20 competing countries).
Rather damningly too, Porteous has found a level of overconfidence in the camp that wasn't managed properly, shortcomings in skills coaching, insufficient rugby-specific practice and weaknesses in the coaching team. The national coach's management style was an issue, as was experienced support for him. Likewise, the coaching and management team required training in dealing with the media.
Ultimately, though, only the lack of match practice was highlighted by the union statement in identifying causes for the "collective failure". Questioned after his presentation, Porteous also highlighted leadership responses to events as they unfolded and a shortage of players as the other main problem areas.
Yet by common consent, Ireland took an unrivalled collection of frontline players to the World Cup, while the failure to develop a squad cannot be solely attributed to the conveyor belt from the provinces.
Porteous having departed, the committee then debated the review in the second half of Monday's meeting, and ratified all the recommendations outlined by the review committee without amendment, although there were dissenting voices and hence they were not passed unanimously.
In fact, whether inadvertently or subtly, much of the review's conclusions in tandem with the recommendations are actually an indictment of the union's strategy of giving so much unfettered control to one individual, and how that control was used.
