Donald Trump’s repeated promise to end Russia’s war on Ukraine “in a day” plays well with his backers who have consistently opposed support for Kyiv. But if the United States succeeds in forcing a ceasefire on Ukraine along the lines suggested by the Trump camp – or by Russian president Vladimir Putin – it would not only be disastrous for Ukraine, but greatly increase the danger of war for the whole of Europe.
Putin has set out clearly his ambition to recapture territory that he feels should be governed from Moscow, far beyond Ukraine. For now, Ukraine has held the front line against these plans for reconquest of Russia’s former dominions. That’s come at immense and tragic cost to the country and its citizens, but it has bought time for the rest of Europe to prepare to meet the Russian threat itself. But not only has most of the Continent squandered the opportunity, but Russia itself has been rebuilding its forces much faster than expected even while suffering horrific casualties on the front line in Ukraine.
There’s probably never before been such unanimity among European and North American intelligence and defence chiefs that Russia is preparing to mount an attack against a Nato state in the near future. Where they disagree is on where and when. What’s striking about the forecasts is that the unexpected recovery of Russia’s land forces – now substantially larger than those that mounted the full-scale invasion in February 2022 – has dramatically reduced the time available. Most publicly released assessments now speak of three to five years before Russia is ready to move – or sooner if large-scale combat in Ukraine is brought to an end in the near future.
As soon as Ukraine is no longer demolishing Russia’s land forces on the front line, Moscow will be able to rebuild and re-equip them much faster – including with manpower pressed into service from Ukraine’s occupied territories, and now reinforcements from North Korea. Meanwhile Russia’s other forces, its navy and air force, remain in relative terms largely unscathed by the war on Ukraine – not to mention its vast nuclear stockpiles. If and when Putin decides it is time to use them, it will change lives across the Continent, because the military and civil defences of western Europe are desperately unprepared.
How seriously you take the threat from Russia has always depended on how close you are to it. The front-line states are in no doubt at all about the immediacy of the threat to their security, and to the lives and livelihoods of their citizens. But the farther west in Europe you go, the easier it has always been to take the view that this is somebody else’s problem.
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That’s led to a pronounced gradient across the Continent in terms not only of understanding the challenge from Russia, but also the seriousness with which measures are taken to withstand it. That includes preparations for conventional defence, with states such as Poland spending far in excess of their Nato commitments in order to ensure that they can deter a military threat from Russia, or if deterrence fails, survive it. But it also includes civil defences, making sure that Russia nonmilitary campaigns of destruction do not throw a country’s economy and vital functions into chaos.
Nevertheless if Russia mounts a military attack on a country that is a member of Nato, all of western Europe will be involved, whether a member of the alliance or not. Nato members themselves, if they observe their treaty obligations, will be immediately part of the conflict – and if they do not, they have betrayed the entire purpose of Nato and will find themselves defenceless when it comes to their turn to be under attack. Countries further away from the scene of the fighting will also be involved because in the complex chain of communications and logistics linking North America to Europe, every link could potentially be the weakest – and with Russia’s preference for attacking the softest target, a country that has neglected its defences and preparedness presents an open invitation to destructive intervention.
The experience of Ukraine shows that Russia doesn’t have to be successful, or correct in its assessment of when to go to war, to inflict horrific damage on its victims. Russia will have its own estimate for when it is ready. It may well not be right, just as in February 2022. But the fine distinction of whether Moscow’s next assault is perfectly timed or wildly misguided won’t help those in the path of its troops and missiles.
And as conflicts in Syria and Ukraine have tragically demonstrated, missile strikes at ranges of hundreds of kilometres targeting a country’s most vulnerable citizens are an integral part of how Russia wages war. That means that any country that does not wish to be coerced or “punished” by Moscow needs to have effective means of defending against the warships and aircraft carrying those missiles. Air, air defence and maritime power are essential arguments in dissuading Russia from aggression. And that in turn means that countries with limited defence capabilities offer weak links in these logistics and communications chains – and Russia prefers soft targets.
There has been no shortage of demonstrations of Russian interest in Ireland’s surrounding waters and the vital infrastructure beneath them. As last week’s incident with the Yantar spy ship demonstrates, Ireland’s new C295 maritime surveillance aircraft are a welcome enhancement to the ability to detect hostile vessels in Irish waters – at least on the surface. But the Yantar showed itself willing to be escorted away, leaving open the question of what can exactly can be done if and when a better-armed Russian vessel is less inclined to be co-operative.
And distance doesn’t lend protection against Russian covert operations either. Russia’s current campaign of sabotage and murder plots across Europe looks a lot like preparations for an open assault on the Continent, especially when the busy reconnaissance of key military, logistics and civil defence points are factored in. These operations can be highly focused or indiscriminate in their targets. Russia’s plot to attack transatlantic airliners, uncovered by Polish intelligence after incendiary devices exploded in courier warehouses in Germany and the UK, will affect passengers regardless of their nationality – just as Russia’s shooting down of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 killed passengers from 10 different countries.
In short, if Russia does move, everybody is a potential target – including countries that might think they are far enough away to be immune. The entirety of Europe’s air, maritime and subsea space and infrastructure will need to be defended, because the more vulnerable it is, the more it presents a weak point for Moscow to attack – and the same applies not just to states, but to private companies and key individuals across the whole of Europe.
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All of this means that nowhere in Europe can hope to be uninvolved. The intensification of Russian intelligence operations working in and through Ireland should have shown beyond doubt that standing aside does not offer protection. And if neutrality provided immunity, then Ukraine – which had explicitly declared neutrality and “non-bloc status” – would not have been invaded in the first place.
In fact whatever restraining influence the concept of international law might once have had on overt acts of aggression is now dead and buried. When the secretary general of the United Nations, the figurehead of the international system protecting law and rights, undertakes a pilgrimage to Russia to quite literally bow down to Vladimir Putin, the leader of an aggressor state who is wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes, he underscores his organisation’s growing irrelevance.
European security has been reliant on the goodwill of the United States through Nato for most of our lifetimes, but the cosy assumption that this could continue indefinitely was misplaced. The panicked reaction across Europe to the re-election of Donald Trump has come years too late for preparing for the changes it will bring.
It’s another indication that defence can no longer be outsourced, whether to a stronger neighbour or to a distant ally, both of whom may be distracted or overextended at the critical moment. It’s urgent that all western European nations follow the lead of their eastern counterparts and look to their defences hoping, but not trusting, that the US will be there to bail them out.
If Putin not only persuades himself that his campaign in Ukraine wholly or partly achieved its aims, but also believes that the damage incurred by Russia’s military was tolerable rather than critical, the next of his wars will arrive sooner rather than later. When that happens, nobody in Europe should think they are far enough away not to be affected.
Keir Giles is a senior fellow with Chatham House’s Russia and Eurasia programme, and director of the Conflict Studies Research Centre in Oxfordshire. His latest book, Who Will Defend Europe? An Awakened Russia and a Sleeping Continent, is published by Hurst
