The ongoing unrest in Iran is the latest challenge to the stability of the Islamic Republic in the past 12 months.
Protests began in late December, when shopkeepers in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar went on strike in response to deteriorating economic conditions. They quickly spread across the country, with some protesters demanding fundamental political change.
The immediate spark for the protests is the steep decline in the value of Iran’s currency and the impact of this on the cost of living. At the end of December of last year, the Iranian rial fell to 1.45 million to one dollar – or double the rate when Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian, took power in September 2024.
However, Iran has been in severe economic crisis for years, not least due to the reimposition of sanctions. The first sanctions were by the United States in 2018. The United Nations Security Council reimposed sanctions last year, after the failure of talks on the country’s nuclear programme, and Iran’s decision to ban inspectors from its nuclear facilities. This followed attacks by the US and Israel last June.
The UN sanctions were even harsher than those previously imposed by the US and led to a deterioration in an already chronic economic situation. According to the International Monetary Fund, consumer prices in Iran rose by 42.4 per cent in 2025 while GDP shrank by 0.69 per cent. Food inflation was even higher than the headline rate at 72 per cent year on year.
The impact of the economic crisis is compounded for many Iranians by endemic corruption. According to Transparency International’s report for 2025, Iran is among the most corrupt countries in the world, ranking 151 out of 180 governments evaluated. Recent scandals have included the publication of details of a $3 billion (€2.6 billion) corruption scandal at the country’s largest steelmaker and the mysterious “disappearance” of another $3 billion from a leading bank. In these and several other cases, regime insiders are implicated.
The current crisis is by no means the first in recent years and has yet to reach the scale of previous events.
In 2019, a sharp increase in petrol prices prompted widespread protests which were violently suppressed, with more than 300 people killed. Some 500 people, including at least 60 children, were killed during the protests that followed the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody in September 2022, after she had been arrested for not wearing her hijab properly. The casualty level during the current disturbances is much lower. At the time of writing, the death toll has reached at least 25 with more than 1,000 people arrested. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, is reported to have set a distinction between “protesters” whose demands were “fair” and “rioters” who must be put in their place. Greater levels of regime repression are likely, should the turmoil persist.
The difficulty for the regime is that it has limited options to address the economic problems that lie at the heart of the protests. There is no indication that Iran’s leaders are willing to compromise on its nuclear programme, which might lead to some relaxation of sanctions. There is no diplomatic process in place. Indeed, recent reports suggest that the country’s Supreme National Security Council met to discuss how to prepare for the possibility of further attacks by the US and/or Israel. Nor does the regime have many options for dealing with the economic crisis. In a debate on the budget in late December, Pezeshkian is reported to have told the Iranian parliament that the state lacks the resources to cushion households from price rises. Earlier in the same month, he told students that he couldn’t do anything to resolve the country’s problems.
Despite the rapid spread of the protests, opinion is divided on the extent of the threat that it poses to regime stability. Both the US and Israeli governments have voiced their support for the protesters. US president Donald Trump threatened unspecified consequences if the regime attacked the protesters. But this simply plays into the hand of regime hardliners who have, for years, branded opposition to the government as agents of hostile powers. Some exiled Iranians have welcomed the stance of the US and Israel, but regime critics within the country reject outside interference, while calling on the authorities to avoid repression. In any case, the protesters lack leadership and organisation.
However, Iran is facing political change sooner or later. The supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, is 87 years old and in poor health, leading to widespread speculation over succession. Formally, his successor will be approved by the Assembly of Experts, a body comprised of 88 clerics (in turn approved by the Guardian Council, whose members are appointed, directly or indirectly, by the supreme leader). It is also reported that Khamenei appointed a secret three-man selection committee in 2023 to resolve the question of succession. The outcome – if any – of these deliberations are unknown. Speculation ranges from hardline figures such as Khamenei’s son Mojtaba to the more reformist Hassan Khomeini, grandson of Iran’s first supreme leader, Ruhollah Khomeini. But Mojtaba Khamenei lacks experience in government and his succession would prompt the charge that Iran had replaced one form of hereditary rule with another.
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There is also some speculation that the next leader may not be a religious figure. The suggestion here is that the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) may see succession as an opportunity for change. Under Khameini, Iran has suffered a series of setbacks – economic, military and geopolitical – and the IRGC may no longer see the religious establishment as an asset, but as a liability. The IRGC enjoys a very powerful position in government, the media and the economy, as well as well as playing a central role in internal security, and may prefer a weak leader over whom it can exert influence. While this outcome may be unlikely, the inevitability of change is not.
Dr Vincent Durac lectures in Middle East politics in the UCD school of politics and international relations
