The sighting by the Naval Service of unidentified drones close to the flight path taken by the aircraft of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskiy on its approach to Dublin Airport on December 1st is part of an escalating pattern of hostile drone incidents in Europe in recent months. These have resulted in the disruption of civilian airports and the targeting of sensitive military locations.
Minister for Justice Jim O’Callaghan concluded that the drone operations were a sophisticated operation that was “generated for the purpose of putting pressure on EU and Ukrainian interests”. The inference seemed clear: disrupting Zelenskiy’s visit – or even targeting his aircraft – was an attempt, most likely by Russia, to remind Europe of the potentially ominous costs of continued EU support for Kyiv. In recent weeks Ireland has added its support to a proposed EU plan to use Russian frozen assets to fund the Ukrainian war effort.
European leaders believe that Russia is behind a recent wave of assassination attempts and a sabotage campaign that has targeted railways and logistics centres in Europe, often subcontracting such activities to foreign criminal networks. European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has noted that drone operations, easy to manufacture and deploy, are part of a “hybrid” campaign waged against the EU. The closure of airports and the requirement for counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) defence capabilities, potentially diverting resources away from military aid to Ukraine, incurs a significant cost to many European governments.
The deployment of the Naval Service vessels the LÉ William Butler Yeats and the LÉ Aoibhinn off Dublin on December 1st was consequently a direct precaution to guard against a potential threat to Zelenskiy. Without the naval presence, given the absence of sophisticated military radar available to the State, it would have been even harder for the Government to assess what really happened.
Nonetheless, the response to the incident highlights worrying issues relating to oversight over national security, command and control within the Defence Forces, and co-operation between the military and An Garda Síochána.
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The first area of concern is the political response to a serious national security incident. Even before more facts were known and an investigation completed, the Government could have made a short statement – that it was investigating reports of drone activity and would update the Oireachtas and the public once more information was gathered and assessments submitted. Instead, the first reports of an incident were relayed nearly three days later by the Journal and by Conor Gallagher in The Irish Times, only fuelling speculation and concern about the security response.
Other European governments and intelligence services have shifted to a security model of greater transparency and public engagement in order to build trust and awareness, such as declassifying summaries of intelligence assessments, reporting incidents and offering public updates on investigations. Anonymous media briefings and counter-briefings given by members of the Defence Forces and An Garda Síochána about what happened on December 1st – including disagreements over the adequacy of the naval response and the Defence Forces rules of engagement – is indicative of a national security system that lacks central direction and clarity over roles and responsibilities.
Evidently the Defence Forces, specifically the Naval Service, was closest to the drones incident, and played a critical role in gathering evidence. But under the Maritime Security Act of 2004, it is An Garda Síochána that has the lead for operations such as those conducted on the night of December 1st, and can ask for assistance from the Defence Forces while remaining in overall operational command. The Garda emergency response unit reportedly received assistance from France, Portugal and the UK to counter potential drone activity around Leinster House, but questions remain over air and maritime defence preparations. If further capabilities were required, was the level of engagement and planning between Irish and other European security services sufficient? Ultimately, it was the Government’s responsibility to ensure adequate inter-agency co-ordination to jointly assess and mitigate against known threats to the Ukrainian president.
A week after the sightings, O’Callaghan observed that the gardaí had “very good anti-drone technology”. It is not clear, however, how this could have been of use to the Naval Service during the Zelensky operation. The Minister went on to say that the acquisition of C-UAS capabilities for the Defence Forces was now a Government priority. Having these in place by the time Ireland’s takes over the EU presidency next summer – when it will host high-level summits to discuss European defence and Ukraine, among other issues – will pose a significant challenge.
The procurement of C-UAS was identified as a priority in the Department of Defence’s 2020 Capability Development Plan. The Government should clarify the reasons for the delay in procuring such a capability. Similarly, there are outstanding questions over the failure to adequately plan for the retirement (and replacement) of the Naval Service flagship LÉ Eithne, with its surveillance radar. The inability to detect and intercept a vessel – with its identification system suspiciously switched off – situated about 19 nautical miles off the Dublin coast in the hours before Zelenskiy’s arrival (subsequently identified by analysis of EU satellite imagery) raises questions about Naval Service capabilities. Blame may not lie with the Defence Forces or the Department of Defence for oversights – but rather in a wider Government failure to adequately respond to defence asks in terms of the prioritisation and allocation of resources.
Structural reforms are also lagging; more than three years on from the report of the Commission on the Defence Forces, the recommended joint strategic headquarters – between the Air Corps, Army and Naval Service – has not yet been delivered. This would enable the closer synchronisation of operations and intelligence dissemination within the military while also allowing for smoother co-operation with other state agencies.
The temptation for politicians who have little time to focus on national security is to defer to the professionals. But even dedicated officers will sometimes prioritise sectoral interests – Army officers will understandably advocate for more land warfare resources, for example – rather than always taking a broader view on national security requirements. That leadership can only come from Government, specifically well-advised ministerial interventions. Recent events were a sharp lesson; defence in government cannot be a part-time job.
Dr Edward Burke is an assistant professor in the history of war at UCD
