While the sudden and devastating Israeli attacks on Iran’s nuclear programme of the past 48 hours raise fears of a wider conflagration in the Middle East, the events of the past two and a half years seem to dictate a limited Iranian response at least in the short term. This is notwithstanding the scale of the Israeli assault – the attacks hit dozens of targets in Iran, in particular nuclear facilities and missile sites, including the Natanz nuclear facility which is one of the key sites for uranium enrichment in Iran. Senior military figures, including the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, the army chief of staff and several nuclear scientists were killed.
The attacks came at a time when US president Donald Trump was offering optimistic prognostications concerning the likelihood of a deal on Iran’s nuclear programme following talks earlier this year, the first round of which took place on April 12th in Oman. As recently as Thursday Omani authorities were confirming the sixth round of talks would take place on Sunday even as the US was ordering an evacuation of its Iraqi embassy and authorising the departure of military dependents from locations across the Middle East.
In a telephone call on June 10th, Trump warned Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu he opposed military action in Iran. He expressed scepticism at Israeli claims that Iran should be presented with a credible military threat, and instead told Netanyahu the Iranians could be convinced to make a deal. All of this is in line with Trump’s own vision of himself as a peace broker, despite his limited success to date in that regard.
[ Most Israelis view a nuclear Iran as an existential threatOpens in new window ]
Notwithstanding the announcement of more talks and Trump’s expressions of optimism regarding the possibility of a deal, negotiations had stalled over US demands that Iran end all uranium enrichment and destroy its stockpile of enriched uranium. Iranian officials indicated they would be willing to stop enrichment at higher levels used for nuclear weapons and scrap its stockpile but would not agree to stop enrichment entirely, arguing it had the right to do so for civilian purposes under international law.
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Trump’s renewed interest in a negotiated deal with Iran was in stark contrast to his decision, during his first term in the White House, to pull the US out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The deal, reached in 2015 between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany, bound Iran to limiting its nuclear weapons programme in return for sanctions relief and other measures.
There are clear indications the regime has been significantly penetrated by Israeli intelligence while its capacity to defend itself from aerial bombardment appears to be quite diminished
For Netanyahu, who opposed negotiations with Iran from the outset, the decision to strike was prompted by a ruling issued by the board of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) on Thursday that Iran was in violation of its nuclear non-proliferation obligations for the first time in 20 years. This followed a recent report from the IAEA which stated Iran had enough uranium enriched to 60 per cent purity to make nine nuclear bombs. Iran denies having ever sought to produce nuclear weapons. Indeed, its supreme leader reportedly stated in 2010 that the use of such weapons was contrary to Islamic precepts.
In a television broadcast, Netanyahu justified the attacks, stating that Iran has recently taken steps to weaponise enriched uranium, which was “a clear and present danger to Israel’s very survival”. This wasn’t the first time Netanyahu suggested Iran was on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons. As far back as September 2012, he told a US audience Iran was six months away from having enough enriched uranium to produce a nuclear weapon. In any case, while the ruling of the IAEA may have provided Netanyahu with the immediate motivation for Israeli action, it is clear from the scale and complexity of the attacks that these were many months in the planning.
This in turn raises the obvious question as to how Iran may respond. The options available to the regime in Tehran are more limited than ever. In the first instance, Iran is undoubtedly possessed of a significant military capacity. Its armed forces are among the largest in the Middle East – 580,000 active-duty personnel and a reserve force of 200,000 in the conventional army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. In addition, it has one of the largest arsenals of missiles and drones in the region – cruise missiles and anti-ship missiles and ballistic missiles with a range of more than 1,200 miles. Its bases and storage facilities are buried deep underground and difficult to destroy from the air.
Many Iranian leaders feel that a bomb would provide them with protection as it has for North Korea
However, there are clear indications the regime has been significantly penetrated by Israeli intelligence while its capacity to defend itself from aerial bombardment appears to be quite diminished. Israeli newspaper reports suggest that Israel built a secret drone base in Iran in advance of the attacks and its intelligence forces engaged in pre-emptive strikes targeting Iranian missile infrastructure and air defence systems. In addition, Israel has been carrying out daytime attacks with limited or no concern for Iranian air defences. It remains the case that the Iranian leadership is unwilling to take retaliatory actions that might invite direct military confrontation with the US, while the position of Iran’s allies in the so-called Axis of Resistance has been weakened dramatically over the course of the conflict which began in October 2023. Clearly, Hamas is engaged in a struggle for survival in Gaza and Hizbullah in Lebanon continues to deal with the aftershocks of Israeli attacks on its leadership and rank and file.
But, while the Israeli ambition is to degrade Iran’s nuclear capability, the most significant impact of the attacks may be the strengthening of the position of those in the leadership who oppose negotiations on the nuclear issue. In its response to the attacks, the Iranian government stated that the world now better understands its insistence on “the right to enrichment, nuclear technology and missile power”, in an indication that it may feel a more urgent need to develop nuclear weapons in response to Israeli attacks. Many Iranian leaders feel that a bomb would provide them with protection as it has for North Korea. For some, this is an existential issue for the Islamic Republic. Ironically and worryingly, Netanyahu’s project for the eradication of the nuclear threat may have the opposite effect of giving Iran’s nuclear programme greater impetus.
Dr Vincent Durac lectures in Middle East politics in the UCD School of Politics and International Relations
