The likely accession of Finland to Nato would more than double by 1,340 km the alliance's shared border with Russia. Moscow has pledged to retaliate by strengthening its border defences, claiming spuriously that Finland's move violates treaty obligations to preserve the military balance in the region.
The Finns will almost certainly be followed by Sweden – two countries that some have mis-characterised, with Ireland and Austria, as the EU's "traditional neutrals". Both have for some time eschewed "neutrality" as a description for "military non-alignment", and have seen the Ukraine invasion also dramatically expand popular support for Nato membership – 68 per cent in favour, in Finland's case. The Ukraine effect has not similarly manifested itself in Ireland.
But Ukraine, and the recent Commission on Defence, have raised important questions about Ireland’s defence preparedness: about funding, about the appropriateness of “neutrality” and even the possibility of Ireland also joining Nato.
Reinventing “neutrality”, whatever we may mean by that, does not, however, have to mean joining Nato, although the recent Irish Times poll does appear broadly to conflate the two distinct issues in the popular mind: 66 per cent were in favour of keeping neutrality “as it is”, while another poll response put opposition to joining Nato at 70 per cent. Even greater EU defence cooperation only got the backing of a third of respondents.
The Government intends a defence policy reappraisal to honour what many see as inescapable moral obligations to show willing to defend fellow EU member states if attacked. To that end it would have to promote an acceptable redefinition of neutrality. And with it, full integration into EU defence and security structures and obligations through a debate which would have to more clearly differentiate in public discourse between the union’s existing mutual defence guarantees and those virtually identical guarantees that form the foundation of the Nato Treaty.
The crucial difference lies in the latter’s core commitment to nuclear deterrence. Unlike the Finns – who do not share Ireland’s concern about nuclear power or deterrence – in Ireland, the case against Nato membership will be made by reference to our long-standing, principled commitment to non-proliferation of nuclear arms, which Ireland does not regard as legitimate weapons of war or defence. The 2017 UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), co-sponsored by Ireland, enshrines that view. Supported as yet by only 50 states, three in the EU, it is incompatible with Nato membership.
Ireland needs to reshape its working definition of neutrality as a positive internationalism – one that embraces the championing of non-proliferation, human rights, multilateralism, UN peacekeeping, and European solidarity.